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We study the optimal design of unemployment insurance for workers sampling job opportunities over
time. We focus on the timing of benefits and the desirability of allowing workers to freely access a
riskless asset. When workers have constant absolute risk aversion preferences, a very simple policy
is optimal: a constant benefit during unemployment, a constant tax during employment, and free access
to savings using the riskless asset. Away from this benchmark, for constant relative risk aversion preferences,
the optimal policy involves nearly constant benefits and the welfare gains from more elaborate policies
are minuscule. Our results highlight two distinct roles for policy toward the unemployed: ensuring
workers have sufficient liquidity to smooth their consumption; and providing unemployment subsidies
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iwerning@mit.eduThis paper argues that there are two distinct components in an optimal policy for the
unemployed: insuring workers against uncertainty in the prospect of ﬁnding a job; and
providing workers with the liquidity to smooth consumption while unemployed. In contrast to
the leading papers on the optimal contracting approach to unemployment insurance (Shavell
and Weiss 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997), we distinguish between these roles by allowing
workers to borrow and save. Our main conclusion is that a constant or nearly constant
beneﬁt schedule is optimal. This insures workers against unemployment risk, while their
ability to dissave and borrow allows them to avoid transitory ﬂuctuations in consumption.
The dichotomy between liquidity and insurance is consistent with the spirit of Feldstein and
Altman’s (1998) proposal for unemployment insurance savings accounts (see also Feldstein
2005).
We represent an unemployed worker’s situation using McCall’s (1970) model of sequential
job search. A risk-averse, inﬁnitely lived worker periodically gets a wage oﬀer from a known
distribution. If she accepts the oﬀer, she keeps the job at a constant wage forever. If she
rejects it, she continues to search.
We compare two unemployment insurance policies. Under constant beneﬁts, the worker
receives a constant beneﬁt while she is unemployed and pays a constant tax once she is
employed. The worker can borrow and lend using a riskless bond. We show that the worker
adopts a reservation wage that is increasing in both the unemployment beneﬁt and the
employment tax, a form of moral hazard. An insurance agency sets the level of beneﬁts and
taxes to minimize the cost of providing the worker with a given amount of utility.
We then consider optimal unemployment insurance. An insurance agency dictates a
duration-dependent consumption level for the unemployed, funded by an employment tax
that depends on the length of the jobless spell. The worker has no access to capital mar-
kets and so must consume her after-tax income. The path of unemployment consumption
and employment taxes determines the worker’s reservation wage, which the insurance agency
cannot directly control. It sets this path to minimize the cost of providing the worker with a
given amount of utility. Absent direct monitoring of wage oﬀers or randomization schemes,
we prove that this is the best unemployment insurance system, in the sense that it provides
the worker with any desired level of expected utility at the lowest cost.
Our main result is that with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, constant
beneﬁts and optimal unemployment insurance are equivalent. That is, the cost of providing
the worker with a given level of utility is the same, the path of her reservation wage is
the same, and the path of her consumption is the same under both insurance systems. In
both cases consumption falls with the duration of the unemployment spell, both while the
worker is unemployed and after she is subsequently reemployed. With optimal unemployment
1insurance, this is a direct feature of the policy. With constant beneﬁts, this pattern follows
from the worker’s own consumption-savings decision.
We also explore optimal insurance with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) prefer-
ences numerically. The equivalence between optimal unemployment insurance and constant
beneﬁts breaks down, but we ﬁnd that our results with CARA provide an important bench-
mark. Optimal unemployment insurance continues to dictate a declining path of consumption
for an unemployed worker and an increasing tax upon reemployment. However, just as in the
CARA case, because both beneﬁts and taxes rise, the implicit subsidy to unemployment, cal-
culated as the net change in the worker’s expected lifetime transfers if she stays unemployed
for an additional period, is not declining. Indeed, while with CARA utility we show that it is
perfectly ﬂat, with CRRA preferences we ﬁnd that it increases slowly during a jobless spell.
In our leading example, the subsidy increases by about ﬁve percent during the ﬁrst year
of unemployment, so the optimal policy has quantitatively nearly-constant unemployment
subsidies. Conversely, we ﬁnd that restricting the unemployment insurance agency to use
a constant beneﬁt policy imposes small costs when workers have adequate liquidity. In our
leading example, constant beneﬁts costs about 10−5 weeks of income more than the optimal
policy.
We also study an intermediate case, where the worker can freely borrow and save, while
the insurance agency can set the timing of beneﬁts optimally given this constraint. The cost of
allowing the worker to engage in hidden borrowing and lending is even smaller. Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that the optimal path of unemployment subsidies rises with the spell’s duration
and is nearly indistinguishable from the one obtained when the agency controls the worker’s
consumption.
Our general message is that simple policies—a constant beneﬁt and tax, combined with
measures to ensure that workers have the liquidity to maintain their consumption level during
a jobless spell—are optimal or nearly optimal. Our intuition for these results is the following.
With CARA utility the fall in assets and consumption that occurs during an unemployment
spell does not aﬀect attitudes toward risk; as a consequence, the optimal unemployment
subsidy is constant. With CRRA utility, the worker becomes more risk averse as consumption
falls; this explains why the optimal subsidy increases over time. However, this wealth eﬀect
is small during a typical, or even relatively prolonged, unemployment spell, provided the
worker is able to smooth her consumption.
Our result is novel along two dimensions. First, papers in the optimal contracting ap-
proach to unemployment insurance, e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997), have concluded that unemployment beneﬁts should decline during an un-
employment spell. When we distinguish between the timing of beneﬁts and the consequent
2timing of consumption, we conﬁrm that consumption should decline during an unemployment
spell but ﬁnd that beneﬁts should be ﬂat or slightly increasing.
Second, the literature on dynamic moral hazard models ﬁnds that it is optimal to constrain
workers’ savings.1 Rogerson (1985) considers an environment in which a risk-averse worker
must make an unobserved eﬀort decision that aﬀects her risk-neutral employer’s proﬁts.
He assumes that the worker’s utility is additively separable in consumption and eﬀort and
concave in consumption. In this environment, a worker confronted with the optimal path of
consumption but permitted to save at the same interest rate as the employer would choose to
defer some of her consumption, and so she is “savings-constrained” by optimal insurance. In
contrast, in our model with CARA preferences there is no role for savings constraints. With
CRRA preferences, the savings distortion is positive, but we ﬁnd it to be very small in our
numerical exercises.
Our paper is related to a broad literature on optimal unemployment insurance in cal-
ibrated incomplete markets economies. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) ﬁnd that in the
absence of any moral hazard problem, optimal beneﬁts are high, about 65 percent of past
wages, and decentralize the complete markets allocation. When the authors introduce moral
hazard to the model by allowing workers to turn down employment opportunities and pos-
sibly still receive beneﬁts, they ﬁnd that the optimal level of unemployment beneﬁts quickly
falls to zero. In their analysis of a general-equilibrium economy, Alvarez and Veracierto
(2001) also ﬁnd that the level of unemployment beneﬁts that maximizes steady state utility
is quite low. Lentz (2007) estimates a job search model with borrowing and savings and ﬁnds
that the optimal constant beneﬁt is always positive and is fairly low for all workers except
those who are up against their borrowing constraint. He does not examine whether liquidity
provision may be preferred to unemployment subsidies.
Using calibrated models in the spirit of Hansen and Imrohoroglu’s, Abdulkadiroglu, Ku-
ruscu, and Sahin (2002) and Wang and Williamson (2002) allow unemployment beneﬁts to
vary during the ﬁrst four periods of an unemployment spell. Instead of an optimal contract-
ing approach, these papers compute a steady state equilibrium for each policy and then use
brute-force to search for the best such steady state. The computational complexity of this
approach prevents them from considering less restrictive policies. In contrast to our ﬁnding
that beneﬁts should be constant or increasing, both papers ﬁnd that optimal beneﬁts may
be nonmonotonic, decreasing early in an unemployment spell and then eventually increasing.
1A recent example is Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003), who emphasize that capital taxation
may discourage saving. Allen (1985) and Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) provide a particularly striking
example of the cost of unobserved savings in a dynamic economy with asymmetric information. They prove
that if a worker privately observes her income and has access to a hidden saving technology, then no insurance
is possible. In our model the employment state is observable, allowing some insurance.
3It is unclear whether this is due to subtle diﬀerences in model assumptions, e.g. both these
papers allow for saving but not borrowing and the source of the moral hazard problems are
diﬀerent, or whether it is a consequence of the restriction on the policy space. In any case, and
closer to our results, both papers emphasize the importance of distinguishing unemployment
beneﬁts from consumption; although beneﬁts may be non-monotone, consumption is always
monotonically declining during an unemployment spell. Both also report relatively modest
gains to allowing for time-varying beneﬁts in an environment with savings. Our contracting
approach is closer to Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and allows us to study optimal unem-
ployment insurance without the ad hoc restrictions imposed by numerical considerations.
Our use of a sequential search departs from Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), which assume
that there is only a job search eﬀort decision.2 There are three reasons for this modeling
choice. First, our model produces stark results on optimal policy in a straightforward way,
which we believe is intrinsically useful. On the other hand, the sequential search model
is not critical for these results. Indeed, the paper most closely related to ours is Werning
(2002), which introduces hidden borrowing and savings into the Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997) search eﬀort model, and some of his results are analogous to ones we report here. For
example, he proves that constant beneﬁts and taxes are optimal under CARA preferences if
the cost of search is monetary. Despite this, and in contrast to our results here, in Werning
(2002) constant beneﬁts are not equivalent to optimal unemployment insurance, even with
CARA utility, since it is always desirable to exclude the worker from the asset market.
Second, the sequential search model is empirically relevant. Starting with the work of
Feldstein and Poterba (1984), a number of authors have documented that an increase in
unemployment beneﬁts raises workers’ reservation wage and consequently reduces the rate
at which they ﬁnd jobs. The sequential search model is a natural one for thinking about this
fact. Third, the sequential search model is the backbone of most research on equilibrium
unemployment. At the heart of the Lucas and Prescott (1974) equilibrium search model and
of versions of the Pissarides (1985) matching model with heterogeneous ﬁrms are individ-
ual sequential search problems. More recently, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) examine an
economy in which each individual engages in sequential job search from an exogenous wage
distribution.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the model’s environment and the two
policies we consider. Section II then establishes the equivalence between the two systems un-
der CARA preferences. Section III quantitatively evaluates optimal unemployment insurance
and optimal constant beneﬁts with CRRA preferences, highlighting the relationship between
2Shavell and Weiss (1979) allow for both hidden search eﬀort and hidden wage draws. See also exercise 21.3
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004). However, both of these models assume that employed workers cannot be
taxed, and neither examines optimal beneﬁts when workers have access to liquidity.
4unemployment insurance and liquidity. Section IV concludes.
I. Two Policies for the Unemployed
We begin by describing the common physical environment of the model. We then discuss
the two policies we consider, constant beneﬁts and optimal unemployment insurance.
A. The Unemployed Worker







where ρ > 0 represents the discount rate and u(c) is the increasing, concave utility function.
At each instant, a worker can be employed at a wage w or unemployed. A worker employed
at w produces w units of the consumption good per unit of time. Following Shavell and Weiss
(1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), we assume that jobs last forever. An unemployed
worker receives a single independent wage draw from the cumulative distribution function F
according to a Poisson process with arrival rate α > 0. We assume that F is continuous and
has ﬁnite expectation and that there is some chance of drawing a positive wage, so F(w) < 1
for some w > 0. The worker observes the wage and decides whether to accept or reject it. If
she accepts w, she immediately becomes employed at that wage. If she rejects w, she remains
unemployed and continues to search for a job. The worker cannot recall past wage oﬀers.
We assume that an unemployment agency only observes whether the worker is employed
or unemployed. In particular, it does not observe the worker’s wage, even after she decides
to take a job.3 The objective of the unemployment insurance agency is to minimize the cost
of providing the worker with a given level of utility, discounted at rate r. We assume that
ρ = r throughout the paper.
B. Policy I: Constant Beneﬁts
The policy we call constant beneﬁts is deﬁned by a constant unemployment beneﬁt ¯ b, a
constant employment tax ¯ τ, and perfect access to a riskless asset with net return r. That is,
3If the wage were observable, an unemployment insurance agency could tax employed workers 100 percent
and redistribute the proceeds as a lump-sum transfer. Workers would be indiﬀerent about taking a job and
hence would follow any instructions on which wages to accept or reject. This makes it feasible to obtain
the ﬁrst best, complete insurance with the maximum possible income. Private information is a simple way
to prevent the ﬁrst best, but other modeling assumptions could also make the ﬁrst best unattainable, e.g.,
moral hazard among employed workers.
5the worker faces the budget constraint ˙ a(t) = ra(t)+¯ b−c(t) if unemployed, and ˙ a(t) = ra(t)+
w − ¯ τ −c(t) if employed at wage w. In addition, the no-Ponzi condition limt→∞ e−rta(t) ≥ 0
must be satisﬁed.
Since the worker’s problem is stationary, we present it recursively. Given policy parame-
ters ¯ b and ¯ τ, start by considering a worker who is employed at wage w and has assets a. Since
the worker’s discount rate is equal to the interest rate, she consumes her after tax-income
plus the interest on her assets ce(a,w) = ra+w − ¯ τ, so that assets are kept constant, ˙ a = 0.
This means that her lifetime utility is
(1) V
e(a,w) =
u(ra + w − ¯ τ)
r
.
Next consider an unemployed worker with assets a and let V u(a) denote her expected














The ﬁrst term on the right hand side describes an unemployed worker’s consumption choice
when she does not have an oﬀer in hand; she chooses consumption to set the marginal utility
of consumption equal to the marginal value of assets. The second term describes the choice
of whether to accept a job paying w, in which case she gets a capital gain V e(a,w)− V u(a),
or to reject it and get nothing. Since V e(a,w) is increasing in w, the worker will accept oﬀers
above some reservation wage and reject the rest.
The solution to the two maximizations in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation gives
the worker’s unemployment consumption cu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) and reservation wage ¯ w(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) policies
as a function of current assets a. Using ˙ a = ra + ¯ b − cu(a;¯ b, ¯ τ), this gives a time path for
assets a(t).
An unemployment insurance agency chooses ¯ b and ¯ τ to maximize the worker’s utility
given some available resources and an initial asset level. Equivalently, we consider the dual
problem of minimizing the total resource cost, equal to beneﬁts net of taxes plus initial assets,



















dt + a0 (3)
subject to V
u(a0;¯ b, ¯ τ) = v0.
A standard Ricardian-equivalence argument implies that V u(a;¯ b, ¯ τ) = V u(a+x/r;¯ b−x, ¯ τ+x)
for any x. The same is true for total resources, so it follows that Cc(v0,a0) is independent of
6a0. Abusing notation, we write Cc(v0).
C. Policy II: Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Under optimal unemployment insurance, a worker who is unemployed at time t consumes
b(t), while a worker who ﬁnds a job at time t pays a tax τ(t), depending on when she ﬁnds
a job, for the remainder of her life. One can conceive of more complicated insurance policies
where the agency asks the worker to report her wage draws, advises her on whether to take
the job, and makes payments conditional on the worker’s entire history of reports. That
is, one can model unemployment insurance as a revelation mechanism in a principal-agent
problem. We prove in Appendix A that the policy we consider here does as well as any
deterministic mechanism as long as absolute risk aversion is non-increasing.
Given {b(t)} and {τ(t)}, consider a worker who chooses a sequence of reservation wages


























The worker remains unemployed at time t ≥ t′ with probability e−
R t
t′ α(1−F( ¯ w(s)))ds, in which
case she gets utility u(b(t)). If she draws a wage above ¯ w(t), she takes the job and gets
u(w − τ(t)) forever.
Now consider an unemployment insurance agency that sets the sequence of unemployment





















subject to two constraints. First, the worker’s utility must equal v0 if she uses the recom-




. And second, she must do
at least as well using the recommended reservation wage sequence as any other sequence








. That is, the agency recognizes that
the worker will choose her reservation wage sequence { ¯ w(t)} to maximize her utility given
{b(t),τ(t)}. The solution to this problem describes optimal unemployment beneﬁts.




7as a state variable. Equation (4) implies that utility evolves according to












































subject to v =
u( ¯ w − τ)
r
, (8)
Moreover, the optimal sequence { ¯ w(t),b(t),τ(t)} must be generated by the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation’s policy functions.
II. Equivalence for a Benchmark: CARA Utility
There are two disadvantages to constant beneﬁts relative to optimal unemployment in-
surance. First, there is a restriction on the time path of unemployment beneﬁts and taxes,
so b(t) and τ(t) are constant. Second, the planner does not directly control the worker’s
consumption and so is constrained by her savings choices. This can be thought of as an
additional dimension of moral hazard. Thus, constant beneﬁts are more costly than optimal
unemployment insurance: Cc(v) ≥ C∗(v). However, in this section we prove analytically that
constant beneﬁts achieve the same outcome as optimal unemployment insurance for the case
with CARA preferences, u(c) = −exp(−γc), where γ > 0 denotes the coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion and we allow c ∈ R. A key feature is that all workers have the same attitude
towards lotteries over future wages, which makes the model particularly tractable. We later
show that these results provide a good benchmark for other preference speciﬁcations.
A. Constant Beneﬁts
We characterize constant beneﬁts in two steps. First, we characterize individual behavior
given unemployment beneﬁts ¯ b, employment taxes ¯ τ, and assets a. Then we discuss how to
choose these parameters optimally. It is convenient to deﬁne the net beneﬁt or unemployment
subsidy by ¯ B ≡ ¯ b + ¯ τ. We can equivalently think of constant beneﬁts as a lump-sum tax ¯ τ,
8paid during both employment and unemployment, together with an unemployment subsidy
¯ B.
The ﬁrst step follows from solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (2).
Proposition 1 Assume CARA preferences. Given a constant beneﬁts policy (¯ b, ¯ τ) with ¯ B =
¯ b + ¯ τ, the reservation wage, consumption and utility of the unemployed satisfy










u(a) = ra − ¯ τ + ¯ w (10)
V
u(a) =
u(ra − ¯ τ + ¯ w)
r
(11)
Proof. The worker’s sequence problem implies that the value function must have the form
(12) V
u(a) =
u(ra − ¯ τ + k1)
r
for some constant k1. We determine this constant, and the rest of the solution along with it.
The maximization with respect to consumption in equation (2) delivers
(13) c
u(a) = ra − ¯ τ + k1
Substituting this and the functional form for V u back into the value function equation (2)
gives
(14) u







u(ra − ¯ τ + w) − u(ra − ¯ τ + k1),0
￿
dF(w).
The right hand side implies that workers accept any wage above k1, i.e. ¯ w = k1. Substi-
tuting this into equation (13) delivers equation (10), while substituting it into equation (12)
delivers equation (11). Now use k1 = ¯ w and the identities u′(c) = −γu(c) and u(c1 − c2) =
−u(c1)/u(c2) to write equation (14) as equation (11).
Equation (9) indicates that the reservation wage ¯ w is increasing in the net unemployment
subsidy ¯ B. This is the essence of the moral hazard problem in our model—the more one tries
to protect the worker against unemployment by raising unemployment beneﬁts and funding
the beneﬁts by an employment tax, the more selective she becomes. The equation also shows
that a worker’s assets a do not aﬀect her reservation wage, so it is constant during a spell of
unemployment.
The consumption policy function in equation (10) has a permanent-income form with a
constant precautionary savings component. Assets evolve as ˙ a = ra +¯ b − cu(a) = ¯ B − ¯ w. If
9there is some chance of getting a wage in excess of the unemployment subsidy, F( ¯ B) < 1,
equation (9) implies ¯ w > ¯ B, and so assets and consumption decline over time. Unemployed
workers face uncertainty: a wage draw above ¯ w is good news leading to a jump up in con-
sumption, while no wage oﬀer, or a draw below ¯ w, is bad news leading to a gradual decline
in consumption.
The next step is to minimize the cost of providing the worker with initial utility v0.
Using the result that the reservation wage is constant and the functional form for V u in
equation (11) to solve out ¯ τ, we can rewrite the optimization problem (3) as
C
c(v0) = min
¯ B, ¯ w
￿ ¯ B
r + α(1 − F( ¯ w))
+




subject to equation (9). The ﬁrst term is the expected present value of unemployment
subsidies, while the second term is a0−¯ τ/r, set at a level to ensure the worker gets utility v0.
Using equation (11) to eliminate ¯ B gives us our characterization of optimal constant beneﬁts:
Proposition 2 Assume CARA preferences. Then the optimal constant beneﬁts policy is
such that ¯ B∗ = ¯ b∗ + ¯ τ∗ is independent of worker’s initial utility v0 and initial assets a0. The
reservation wage satisﬁes ¯ w∗ ∈ argmax ¯ w Φ( ¯ w), where




1 + γ ¯ w + u(w − ¯ w)
￿
dF(w)
r + α(1 − F( ¯ w))
.










Given ¯ w∗, the promised utility v0, and initial assets a0, we can compute ¯ b∗ and ¯ τ∗ from
equations (9) and (11). Of course, Ricardian equivalence implies that arbitrary combinations
of initial assets and lump-sum taxes deliver the same allocations. Optimality only pins down
the unemployment subsidy ¯ B∗ = ¯ b∗ + ¯ τ∗.
B. Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Next we characterize optimal unemployment insurance when the insurance agency has
access to time-varying beneﬁts and taxes and can control workers’ consumption. To do so,
it is convenient to ﬁrst deduce the shape of the cost function directly from the sequence
problem.






Moreover, let { ¯ w∗(t),b∗(t),τ∗(t)} denote the optimum for initial promised utility u(0)/r.
Then {¯ w∗(t),b∗(t) + u−1(rv),τ∗(t) − u−1(rv)} is optimal for any initial promise v.
Proof. Equation (4) and CARA preferences imply that adding x to unemployment consump-
tion and subtracting x from the employment tax simply multiplies lifetime utility by the posi-







t′,{¯ w(t),b(t) + x,τ(t) − x}
￿
for all x.
Now let C0 ≡ C∗(u(0)/r). If the policy { ¯ w∗(t),b∗(t),τ∗(t)} is optimal for initial promised
utility u(0)/r, the policy { ¯ w∗(t),b∗(t)+u−1(rv),τ∗(t)−u−1(rv)} is feasible and delivers utility
v. A standard revealed preference argument establishes it is optimal. The cost of this policy
is u−1(rv)/r plus the cost of the policy that delivers utility u(0)/r, completing the proof.
The optimal path for consumption shifts in parallel with promised utility, while the path
for the reservation wage is unchanged. The cost function reﬂects these two features. Indeed,
since promised utility is a state variable for the problem, the lemma implies that the optimal
reservation wage path will be constant. These results are implications of the absence of
wealth eﬀects with CARA preferences.
To ﬁnd the constant C0, substitute the cost function from equation (17) into the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation (7) and evaluate it at v = u(0)/r. Use the incentive constraint (8)
to eliminate the employment tax τ; and use the ﬁrst order condition u′(b)C∗′(v) = 1 from
equation (7) to eliminate unemployment consumption b. Solving for C0 gives





¯ w (1 + γ ¯ w + u(w − ¯ w))dF(w)







where Φ( ¯ w) is deﬁned by equation (15).
Equation (18) reveals that the reservation wage is constant and identical to that in the
case of constant beneﬁts. Substituting equation (18) into equation (17) proves that the cost
to the agency with optimal unemployment insurance, C∗(v), is identical to the cost with
constant beneﬁts, Cc(v) in equation (16). Our main result follows:
Proposition 3 Assume CARA preferences. The allocation obtained with constant beneﬁts
is optimal.
In other words, given a level of promised utility, the path of consumption contingent on
the history of wage draws is the same under constant beneﬁts and optimal unemployment
11insurance. There is no loss in allowing the worker to borrow and lend, nor any loss in restrict-
ing the planner to the simple policy. Under both policies, consumption falls while a worker
remains unemployed and remains lower once the worker is reemployed. In the case with
constant beneﬁts, the worker achieves this by decumulating assets during an unemployment
spell.
When workers can freely borrow and lend the constant beneﬁt policy is optimal, but,
by Ricardian equivalence, there are many other transfer policies that achieve the same al-
location. For example, suppose we set a worker’s initial assets to zero and use the optimal
unemployment insurance path {b∗(t),τ∗(t)} for beneﬁts and taxes. Note that b∗(t) is decreas-
ing and τ∗(t) is increasing as a function of unemployment duration t. Although the worker
can borrow and save, she optimally consumes her after-tax income and keeps her assets at
zero.
In what sense then can we say that constant beneﬁts characterize the optimum? To
answer this, we deﬁne the subsidy to unemployment at some time t in a way that is invariant
to all Ricardian-equivalent policies. Suppose that if a worker takes a job at t, she must pay
taxes equal to
τ(t)
r in present value terms. If she remains unemployed until t′, she receives a
transfer
R t′
t e−r(t′′−t)b(t′′)dt′′ and then pays taxes valued at e−r(t′−t) τ(t′)
r . The diﬀerence is the
unemployment subsidy between t and t′. To obtain the instantaneous subsidy at t, divide by
t′ − t and take the limit as t′ converges to t:




Any optimal policy {b(t),τ(t)} must set B(t) = ¯ B∗. In particular, the unemployment subsidy
is the same with constant beneﬁts or optimal unemployment insurance.
III. Wealth Effects: CRRA Utility
The closed form results we obtained so far were derived under an assumption of CARA
preferences. This section analyzes an alternative case numerically, constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA). The period utility function is u(c) = c1−σ
1−σ , where σ > 0 denotes the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
We again consider our two alternative policies: optimal unemployment insurance and
constant beneﬁts. The equivalence between these two policies breaks down with CRRA
preferences. In our numerical examples, optimal unemployment insurance involves a subsidy
that gradually rises during an unemployment spell. In addition, the unemployment insurance
agency distorts the worker’s savings behavior: if she had access to a storage technology
12with the same rate of return as the agency’s, a worker would choose to save some of her
income. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd little welfare gain in moving from constant beneﬁts to optimal
unemployment insurance.
We also analyze an intermediate case, where beneﬁts may change during an unemploy-
ment spell but the worker is free to borrow and lend at the same interest rate as the insurance
agency. We ﬁnd that the optimal path of unemployment subsidies is quantitatively indistin-
guishable from the case where savings is observable. In particular, the subsidy again rises
slowly during an unemployment spell.
A. Parameterization
To proceed numerically, we need to make choices for the discount rate r = ρ, the arrival
rate of job oﬀers α, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion σ, the wage distribution F(w),
and the worker’s initial utility v0. Given our model’s simplifying assumptions, we do not
seek a deﬁnitive calibration. Instead, we explored the more qualitative results, which can be
compared to the CARA benchmark, for a range of parameter values.
We normalize the time unit to be a week and set r = 0.001, equivalent to an annual
discount factor of 0.949. We ﬁx the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion at σ = 2 but later
consider the robustness of our results to a higher value, σ = 6.4
We adopt a Fr´ echet wage distribution, F(w) = exp(−zw−θ) with support (0,∞), and
parameters z,θ > 0. We set α = 1 but ﬁnd little sensitivity of our results to this choice.
With CRRA preferences, the parameter z acts as an uninteresting scaling factor on wages,
and so we normalize z = 1 without loss of generality. The mean log wage draw is then
¯ γ
θ,
where ¯ γ ≈ 0.577 is Euler’s constant, and the standard deviation of log wages is π √
6θ ≈ 1.28
θ .
We set θ = 100, which implies that, in the absence of unemployment beneﬁts, the weekly job
ﬁnding rate is about 0.1 (Meyer 1990). Figure 1 plots the density function F ′(w), in particular
highlighting the positive skewness of the distribution. We also consider the robustness of our
results to changes in the wage distribution, to θ = 20, which increases the dispersion in
wages, raising the option value of job search and the expected duration of unemployment.
Finally, we set the worker’s initial utility so the cost of optimal unemployment insurance
is zero, C∗(v0) = 0.
4Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) use σ = 1/2 in their baseline calibration. They argue that over short
horizons, a high intertemporal elasticity of substitution may be appropriate. In our view, this remark res-
onates introspectively, but is at the same time misleading since it confounds attitudes regarding consumption
and net income paths. In their model, consumption and net income are equivalent; but our model allows
saving and borrowing, and as a result a worker displays an inﬁnite elasticity of substitution with respect to




















Figure 1: Wage density: F ′(w) = θw−θ−1e−w−θ, θ = 100.
B. Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Optimal unemployment insurance is obtained using the policy functions from the Ham-
ilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (7) and (8). It is straight-forward to solve this as a system
of diﬀerential equations. In our baseline parameterization, C∗(v0) = 0 implies v0 = −977.6,
which is equivalent to a certain consumption of 1.023 forever. We ﬁnd that the cost function
C∗(v) is nearly linear in consumption equivalent units u−1(rv), with a slope of approximately
1/r when v is large. We obtained this slope as an exact result with CARA utility; see
equation (17).
With optimal unemployment insurance, a worker accepts 9.65 percent of job oﬀers at
the start of her unemployment spell. The job ﬁnding hazard declines monotonically but
gradually to 9.58 percent after 1000 weeks of unemployment, so the reservation wage is
virtually constant. It is worth noting that the chance of a twenty year unemployment spell
is vanishingly small; 99.3 percent of unemployment spells end in the ﬁrst year, with a similar
hazard rate in each subsequent year.
Turning to the policy that implements this reservation wage, the left panel in Figure 2
shows that a worker’s unemployment consumption b(t) is falling over time (dashed brown
line), while her reemployment tax τ(t) is increasing (dash-dot orange line). Putting these
together, a worker’s expected utility v(t) declines over time. The right panel plots the









































Figure 2: Optimal unemployment consumption b(t), employment taxes τ(t), and unemploy-
ment subsidy B(t) = b(t) + τ(t) − τ′(t)/r during the ﬁrst 1000 weeks of unemployment.
represents optimal unemployment consumption and reemployment taxes for an arbitrary level
of initial utility v0.
We also look at the subsidy to unemployment, the additional resources that a worker gets
by remaining unemployed for one more period (equation 19). The solid blue line in Figure 2
shows that the unemployment subsidy is initially about 0.021. It rises to 0.022 if the worker
stays unemployed for a year and continues to rise thereafter as utility falls during a prolonged
spell of unemployment.
The picture of b(t) and τ(t) in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) is qualitatively similar to
our Figure 2, but they do not compute the distinctive path of the unemployment subsidy
B(t).5 B(t) is much lower than unemployment consumption b(t) because the rising employ-
ment tax τ(t) acts as an implicit debt that ﬁnances unemployment consumption; likewise,
the subsidy B(t) is ﬂatter because as b(t) falls, τ(t) rises so that the net disincentive to ﬁnd
a job is kept near constant. In this way, the transfers and taxes b(t) and τ(t) can be seen as
an unemployment subsidy combined with a loan from the insurance agency. This distinction
between unemployment consumption and subsidies is crucial for understanding the diﬀer-
ence between the results of this paper on the one hand, and Shavell and Weiss (1979) and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) on the other.
5Werning (2002) computes the net subsidy to unemployment from Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) allo-
cation and ﬁnds that it is nearly constant, starting quite low and rising very slowly.
15C. Constant Beneﬁts
We now turn to the solution of equation (3), characterizing the optimal constant ben-
eﬁt policy. We have already observed that optimal unemployment insurance entails nearly
constant beneﬁts during the ﬁrst year of unemployment and that the probability of an un-
employment spell lasting longer than a year is very small. This suggests that there may be
little loss in restricting the unemployment insurance agency to use constant beneﬁts. We
conﬁrm this result, at least when workers have access to adequate liquidity.
In our baseline parameterization, we ﬁnd that Cc(v0) = 0.02. That is, the cost of re-
stricting the unemployment insurance agency to using constant beneﬁts is equal to about
two percent of average weekly earnings. Despite this small cost, the optimal policy with
constant beneﬁts is quite diﬀerent than optimal unemployment insurance. The agency sets
¯ B = ¯ b + ¯ τ = 0.073, more than three times the initial level of the optimal unemployment
subsidy B(0) shown in Figure 2.
To understand why ¯ B is larger than B(0), it is important to think about borrowing con-
straints. With CRRA preferences, the no-Ponzi condition limt→∞ e−rta(t) ≥ 0 is equivalent
to Aiyagari’s (1994) natural borrowing constraint: assets must stay suﬃciently high to en-
sure that, with probability 1, a worker can pay the interest on her debt while maintaining
nonnegative consumption. Since we have assumed that there is always a chance of not get-
ting a job oﬀer during an arbitrarily long time period, an unemployed worker’s labor income
may be zero over any ﬁnite horizon with positive (though vanishing) probability. The nat-
ural borrowing constraint then requires that a ≥ a = −¯ b/r. Higher unemployment beneﬁts
then serve two roles: they insure workers against unemployment risk, and they provide a
guaranteed source of income, which allows a worker borrow more against her future income.
To disentangle the insurance and liquidity roles of unemployment beneﬁts, we introduce
an additional policy instrument. At any time, an unemployed worker may go on welfare. If
she chooses to do this, she is paid w > 0 forever (at a cost w/r) and she must continue to
pay the interest on her debt. On the other hand, she forgoes the possibility of getting a job.





Setting w = 0.2 makes the cost of constant beneﬁts negligible, on the order of 10−5, while it
lowers the optimal constant beneﬁt to ¯ B = 0.022, in line with the initial optimal unemploy-
ment subsidy. Under this policy, a worker can spend about 4 years unemployed before she
goes on welfare; the probability that she has to do so is about 10−15. Thus welfare oﬀers little
insurance and so has a small direct eﬀect on incentives; but it provides liquidity by allowing
16a worker to borrow far more than she could with constant beneﬁts.
We now brieﬂy analyze an intermediate case: optimal time-varying unemployment in-
surance with hidden savings (Werning 2002). Relative to constant beneﬁts, this is a less
restrictive policy because unemployment beneﬁts and reemployment taxes may change arbi-
trarily during an unemployment spell. Relative to optimal unemployment insurance, hidden
savings constrains the unemployment insurance agency because it cannot distort the worker’s
consumption-savings decision.
Formally, we look for unemployment beneﬁts and reemployment taxes which ensure that
the worker maintains zero assets when she can borrow and lend at rate r = ρ; by Ricardian
equivalence, there is no loss of generality in this timing of transfers. Also without loss of
generality, the employment tax τ(t) depends only on the time t when the worker found a job.




















subject to ˙ a(t) = ra(t)+b(t)−c(t) and the no-Ponzi game condition, with a(0) = 0 given. One
implication of this is that the worker’s consumption Euler equation must hold, so marginal
utility is a Martingale:
(20) u









Following Werning (2002), we introduce the marginal utility of consumption as an addi-
tional state variable and solve the cost minimization problem (7)–(8) with the additional
constraint (20), which can be seen as a law of motion for the new state variable. The Euler
equation (20) together with (8) are necessary for the worker’s optimum. Since they may not
be suﬃcient, we are solving a relaxed planning problem. Therefore, after ﬁnding a solution
to this relaxed problem, the last step is to verify that under the proposed policy the worker’s
optimum involves no saving: a(t) = 0 for all t. If this is the case, then the solution to the
relaxed problem and the original hidden-savings planning problem coincide.
When we implement this program, we ﬁnd that allowing for hidden savings has a negligible
eﬀect on the cost of unemployment insurance; this is not surprising since constant beneﬁts
augmented with welfare already reduced the cost to 10−5. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that the
optimal path of unemployment subsidies is quantitatively indistinguishable from the model
with observable savings; at 0 and at 52 weeks, the diﬀerence in optimal unemployment
subsidies is of the order 10−6. This reinforces our two main conclusions: the optimal policy
entails nearly constant beneﬁts; and the cost of restricting policy to use constant beneﬁts
17while allowing the worker to borrow and lend is minuscule.
D. Robustness
This section discusses the robustness of our results. We ﬁrst ask the extent to which
our results depend on the wage distribution, in particular on the assumption that a worker
ﬁnds a job in ten weeks on average. There are a few reasons to explore this assumption.
First, our results indicate that constant unemployment beneﬁts and constant employment
taxes do almost as well as a fully optimal unemployment insurance policy. It could be
that this result would go away if unemployment spells tended to last longer and therefore
presented a bigger risk to individuals. Second, in many countries, notably much of Europe,
unemployment duration is substantially longer, although this is at least in part a response to
unemployment beneﬁts that are high compared to workers’ income prospects (Ljungqvist and
Sargent 1998; Blanchard and Wolfers 2000). And third, workers typically experience multiple
spells of unemployment before locating a long-term job (Hall 1995). Although modeling this
explicitly would go beyond the scope of this paper, we have found in other work that raising
unemployment duration has similar eﬀects on optimal beneﬁt levels to modeling repeated
unemployment spells (Shimer and Werning 2007).
To explore this possibility, we choose θ = 20, so that expected unemployment duration
of a risk-neutral worker with no unemployment beneﬁts is about one year. This raises the
unconditional standard deviation of wages by a factor of ﬁve, which increases the option
value of job search. We revisit our main conclusions under this alternative parameterization:
• Under optimal unemployment insurance, the subsidy B(t) rises slowly. We start a
worker with utility v0 such that C∗(v0) = 0. The optimal subsidy is 0.113 initially and
rises to 0.118 after one year of unemployment and 0.2 after ten years, relative to a mean
wage draw of 1.03.
• The optimal job ﬁnding rate changes slowly. In the same experiment, it rises from 1.898
percent per week to 1.901 percent per week during the ﬁrst ten years of unemployment.
• There is little cost to constant beneﬁts. The optimal constant beneﬁt that delivers
utility v0 sets ¯ B = 0.25 and costs Cc(v0) = 0.59, about half a week’s income.
• Providing liquidity further reduces costs. Augmenting constant beneﬁts with a welfare
program that delivers income 1 reduces the cost of constant beneﬁts to less than 0.001
and lowers the optimal constant beneﬁt to ¯ B = 0.124. Allowing for time-varying bene-
ﬁts with hidden saving has a negligible eﬀect on costs and on optimal policy compared
to optimal unemployment insurance with observable savings.
18We have also examined the robustness of our results to higher risk aversion by setting
σ = 6. Optimal unemployment subsidies are higher than the benchmark with σ = 2, as the
CARA results suggest. Otherwise this change in preferences has little eﬀect on our results.
Finally, we have focused on the savings distortions of unemployed workers. This makes
sense since in our model, it is not optimal to distort the savings of employed workers. However,
in a version of the model with repeated unemployment spells, savings distortions during
employment may be part of a comprehensive optimal tax system. While the extension to
repeated spells and the study of optimal taxation of employed workers is beyond the scope
of this paper on unemployment insurance, we believe that our results on savings distortions
during unemployment are unlikely to be aﬀected.
IV. Conclusion
This paper characterizes optimal unemployment insurance in a sequential search model.
Our main result is that with CARA preferences, constant beneﬁts coupled with free access
to borrowing and lending of a riskless asset is optimal. With CRRA preferences, the exact
optimality of constant beneﬁts breaks down. In numerical explorations, we ﬁnd that the
optimal unemployment subsidy rises very slowly over time. However, we ﬁnd little loss to
a constant unemployment subsidy if workers are given enough liquidity. This quantitative
result is robust to the key parameters of the model. These conclusions contrast with Shavell
and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) because these papers do not separate
insurance from liquidity.
Our distinction between liquidity and insurance resonates with recent policy proposal
by Feldstein and Altman (1998) and Feldstein (2005). These papers discuss replacing un-
employment beneﬁts with unemployment saving accounts, which provide workers with the
liquidity needed to help smooth consumption through unemployment spells. Workers must
save into these accounts while employed and can draw them down during unemployment. At
retirement workers can keep the positive balance, while some debt may be forgiven, the only
insurance component of the plan. Although our results do not support zero unemployment
subsidies, the optimal level of beneﬁts may be low once liquidity is ensured; they turned out
to be so in our simulations. Of course, our model has nothing to say about the forced-saving
element of this policy proposal.
We have deliberately written a stark model of job search in order to keep the analysis
relatively simple and comparable to previous work on the timing of unemployment beneﬁts.
While the model lends itself to various extensions, our results suggest that it will be important
to evaluate the relative eﬃciency of simple beneﬁt policies coupled with free access to the asset
19market and to distinguish between insuring workers against uncertainty in the duration of a
jobless spell and ensuring they have the liquidity to smooth consumption while unemployed.
Appendix
A. General Mechanisms
This section uses the revelation principle to set up the most general deterministic mech-
anism that an unemployment insurance agency might contemplate given the assumed asym-
metry of information. We allow the worker to make reports on the privately observed wage
and we allow taxes to vary during an employment spell. We show that neither of these
capabilities is useful: the planner does just as well by oﬀering unemployment beneﬁts that
depend on the duration of unemployment, and setting employment taxes that depend on the
duration of the previous unemployment spell, not on employment tenure.
A. The Recursive Mechanism
For notational convenience, we present the general mechanism directly in its recursive
form—this can be justiﬁed along the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987). Our general
mechanism involves the following:
1. At any point in time the unemployed worker has some promise for expected lifetime
utility v. The policy objects b, τ(w,t), and vu(w), explained below, depend implicitly
on this value.
2. At any point in time the unemployed worker can claim to have received a wage oﬀer
and make a report ˆ w to the planner:
(a) If the worker reports ˆ w < ¯ w, she rejects the job and is promised a new continuation
utility vu( ˆ w).
(b) If the worker reports ˆ w ≥ ¯ w, she accepts the job and pays a tax τ( ˆ w,t) in each
subsequent period t ≥ 0.
Note that since employment is observable, a worker without a wage oﬀer cannot claim
to have an oﬀer w ≥ ¯ w, only an oﬀer w < ¯ w.
3. While unemployed the worker receives an unemployment beneﬁt b and lifetime utility
20evolves according to











B. The Planner’s Problem
Let C∗(v) denote the cost to the planner of having a worker with promised utility v. The













































−ρtu(w − τ(w,t))dt ≥ max{v






−ρtu(w − τ( ˆ w,t))dt ˆ w ≥ ¯ w > w (23)
v
u(w) ≥ v
u( ˆ w) ¯ w > w, ˆ w (24)
v
u(w) ≥ v ¯ w > w (25)
v ≥ v
u( ˆ w) ¯ w > ˆ w (26)
Inequality (21) ensures that workers that take a job do not misrepresent their wage. Inequal-
ity (22) ensures that they are willing to report a wage w ≥ ¯ w rather than report a lower wage
or claim not to have gotten an oﬀer at all. Inequality (23) ensures that workers who get an
oﬀer w < ¯ w do not claim to have an acceptable oﬀer. Inequality (24) ensures that workers
who do not take a job do not misrepresent the rejected wage. Inequality (25) ensures that
workers that get an oﬀer but should not take a job do not prefer to claim they did not receive
an oﬀer. Finally, inequality (26) ensures that workers that do not have an oﬀer do not wish
21to claim that they actually do, but that the oﬀer is below ¯ w and should be rejected.
We now proceed to simplify the planner’s problem.
Lemma 2 (a) Suppose an optimum has the schedule vu(w), then the mechanism that replaces
it with a constant schedule vu(w) = v for any w < ˆ w is also optimal. (b) The incentive





−ρtu( ¯ w − τ( ¯ w,t))dt,
and constraint (21).
Proof. (a) Condition (25) and (26) imply that vu(w) = v for all w < ¯ w.
(b) For a constant v the constraints (24)–(26) are trivially satisﬁed. Since the right-hand





−ρtu(¯ w − τ( ˆ w,t))dt
for all ˆ w ≥ ¯ w. Constraint (21) implies ˆ w = ¯ w maximizes the right-hand side of this inequality,





−ρtu( ¯ w − τ( ¯ w,t))dt.




−ρtu(w − τ(w,t))dt ≥ v.












−ρtu( ¯ w − τ( ¯ w,t))dt,
where the ﬁrst inequality uses (21) and the second uses monotonicity of the utility function.





−ρtu(¯ w − τ( ¯ w,t))dt ≥ v.
Inequalities (28) and (29) hold if and only if equation (27) holds, completing the proof.
22C. Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
So far we have not made any assumptions about the period utility function u except
that it is increasing. This section examines the implications of having constant absolute risk
aversion preferences.
Lemma 3 With CARA utility, an optimum must feature the tax on the employed τ(w,t)
independent of w and t.
Proof. With exponential utility w on both sides of equation (21) cancels, implying that the
remaining term
R ∞
0 e−rtu(−τ(w,n)) must be some value independent of w. Let x denote this



















Using r = ρ, the ﬁrst order condition for this problem reveals that an τ(w,t) must be
independent of (w,t).
Lemmas 2 and 3 allow us to rewrite the planning problem as in (7)–(8). Private informa-
tion prevents “employment insurance,” so the tax rate τ is independent of the wage. With
CARA preferences and jobs that last forever, the wage eﬀectively acts as a permanent multi-
plicative taste shock. This ensures that all employed workers have the same preferences over
transfer schemes, which makes it impossible to separate workers according to their actual
wages. Since workers have concave utility, introducing variability in taxes is not eﬃcient.
With non-CARA utility, workers with diﬀerent wages rank tax schedules diﬀerently. In
some cases, it may be possible to exploit these diﬀerences in rankings to separate workers
according to their wage; see Prescott and Townsend (1984) for an example. If workers have
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), including CRRA preferences, those earning lower
wages are more reluctant to accept intertemporal variability in taxes. One can therefore
induce these workers to reveal their wage by giving them a choice between a time-varying
employment tax with a low discounted cost and a constant tax with a high cost. High wage
workers would opt for the time-varying schedule. This does not, however, reduce the planner’s
cost of providing an unemployed worker with a given level of utility, since it transfers income
from low wage to high wage workers. It is therefore not optimal.
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